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 ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines voting and ideology among unemployed and low-income groups 
in Poland from the period of 1991 to 2005.  In the years immediately following the 
Communist overthrow, many Poles believed that market reform would bring social 
and economic stability to their turbulent country.  In parliamentary elections 
throughout the early period, voters alternated between electing centrists and social 
democrats, who offered different policy options on domestic socio-economic issues, 
but supported the neoliberal macro-economic program of privatization and 
deregulation.  However, in the most recent election, a coalition of right-wing parties 
campaigning on platforms of conservatism and Catholic nationalism easily came to 
power under economic circumstances of extremely high unemployment which the 
outgoing Social Democratic administration had been unable to ameliorate; the Right’s 
economic stance is rhetorically more populist but does not challenge the basic market 
reform program.  This study looks at voting behavior of Poles through all of these 
elections, in order to determine what parties have drawn their support over time, and 
what political ideologies have accompanied their votes during the same periods.  I 
initially predict that, in the absence of state control over macro-economic conditions, 
the Right has provided an ideological scapegoat to unemployed and economically 
marginalized voters: its brand of traditionalism and nationalism directs inchoate anger 
in a very concrete way towards markers of encroaching cosmopolitan Europeanism.  I 
theorize that these ideological themes have been historically consistent organizers of 
Polish identities, but only recently have become political-behavioral motivators.  
Through data analysis, I find my hypothesis to be only partially true.  My findings 
support the idea that the Right’s political appeal has become consolidated in recent 
years around key ideologies (in particular, religious traditionalism, social 
  
conservatism, and anti-Communism).  But, contrary to my expectations, I find that the 
more educated—perhaps, the angry middle class—may be the Right’s new 
constituency in Poland, and not the marginalized. 
 
 iii   
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
Megan Eileen Gremelspacher grew up in Granby, Connecticut and attended the 
Loomis Chaffee School in Windsor, Connecticut.  She received her Bachelor of Arts 
degree in June 2002 from Middlebury College in Middlebury, Vermont, with a major 
concentration in Environmental Studies and a minor concentration in French.  Before 
coming to Cornell University in August 2005, she worked in Vermont with various 
progressive political and social organizations. 
 
 iv   
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This project was completed with the support of the Department of Development 
Sociology, in the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, at Cornell University.  
Particular thanks go to my Special Committee Chair, Tom Hirschl, and my Second 
Committee Member, David Brown, for their guidance and encouragement.  I also wish 
to thank David Ost, professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith 
Colleges, for his help with this project.  Thanks must also be expressed to my parents 
for their support. 
 v   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Biographical Sketch                                                                                                   p. iii 
Acknowledgements                                                                                                    p. iv 
List of Figures                                                                                                            p. vi 
List of Tables                                                                                                            p. vii                   
Introduction                                                                                                                 p. 1 
Literature Review                                                                                                        p. 5 
 Ideological Change During and After Major Social Transformations            p. 4 
 The Rise of the Right in Post-Socialist Societies                                            p. 6 
 Growing Income Inequality Under Marketization                                        p. 12 
 Economic Interests and Political Choice                                                      p. 17  
 Material and Ideal Interests                                                                           p. 20 
 The Resonance of Right-Wing Ideology Among the Economically Insecure 
p. 25 
 The Unemployed Vote in Poland                                                                  p. 30 
Data and Methods                                                                                                     p. 33 
Results                                                                                                                       p. 38 
Discussion                                                                                                                 p. 51 
Appendix                                                                                                                   p. 64 
Bibliography                                                                                                              p. 67  
 vi   
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 Predicted History of Nationalist Ideology: Continuous and Discontinuous
 Scenarios                                                                                                       p. 10 
 vii   
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 Voting Over Time: Percentage of Votes for the Right and Left                    p. 2 
Table 2 The Unemployment Rate in Percentages                       
p. 13 
Table 3 Trends in Ideology Over Time: Percentage of Respondents by Category   p. 39 
Table 4 Ideological Preference and Voting Over Time: Cell Counts and Base 2 Log
 Odds of Voting for the Right                                                                        p. 42  
Table 5 Fitted Regression Models for Each Election Year: Factors Affecting Right
 Wing Voting                                                                                                  p. 45 
Table 6 Ideological, Socioeconomic, and Demographic Effects on the Odds of Voting
 for the Right                                                                                                  p. 46 
Table 5b Fitted Regression Models for Each Election Year: Occupation Replacing
 Education                                                                                                      p. 64 
Table 6b Ideological, Socioeconomic, and Demographic Effects on the Odds of
 Voting for the Right: Occupation Replacing Education                               p. 65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1   
INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent rise in the political fortunes of conservative Catholic nationalist 
parties in Poland suggests that this identity has become socially resonant in a new 
way.  In this study, I will consider this development in the context of scholarly 
discussion about the “rise of the right” in societies that have experienced macro-social 
change.  I will also explore the role that interest and identity play in voting behavior, 
in order to reflect on the possible motivations of right-wing voters in Poland.  In doing 
so, I seek to shed light on the source of this apparently new rightist construction of the 
Polish identity.   
One of the post-socialist societies of Central Europe, Poland underwent a 
revolution that unified millions of its citizens in the common goal of developing a free 
civil society.  Poles rebelled against a regime defined by authoritarianism—a 
paternalistic state which provided basic social welfare for all, but no democracy—and 
replaced it with a Europeanized system based on market liberalism and civil liberty.  
Today, it has one of the highest GDPs of any post-socialist state in the region.  Yet, 
contrary to Western expectations of democratic deepening, Poland has not continued 
to evolve in a linear fashion towards cosmopolitanism and liberalism; in fact, the 
nation seems to be taking a turn toward nationalism and authoritarianism, if recent 
elections indicate a burgeoning trend.    
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Table 1 Voting Over Time: Percentage of Votes for the Right and Left  
  
Year Right Left 
1991 13 87 
1993 40.6 59.4 
1997 46.1 53.9 
2001 29.9 70.1 
2005 [60.7]* [36.1]* 
*Figures from Polish National Electoral Commission.  All other figures from 
Polish General Social Survey. 
Note: Fringe parties with less than one percent of the vote have been omitted 
from calculations. 
 
Polish politics after the collapse of socialism had been marked by a strong 
adherence to economic liberalism and a relative ambivalence on social policy.  Led by 
an intellectual elite mostly composed of former Solidarity members, the early 
democratic government pushed for market reform and removal of lingering 
Communist elements.  Capitalism “done right” was supposed to ameliorate the short-
term shock of transition and the immediate rise in unemployment and poverty (see Ost 
2005).  Over time, both moderately conservative and social democratic politicians 
campaigned and won elections on liberal economic platforms; market reform was 
presented and accepted as the only economic option in the new Poland, while a broad 
range of domestic socio-economic policies continued to differentiate the parties for 
voters.  To the gratification of foreign investors and European neighbors, the 
“Western” values of individualism and privatization seemed to have become part of 
the Polish national identity. 
However, Poland’s 2005 parliamentary elections ushered into power a 
coalition of conservative right-wing parties advocating traditional family and Catholic 
values, national sovereignty, and populism.  The social democratic party, recently 
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involved in a corruption scandal, lost all its senators and ended up with barely a 
quarter of its seats in the House.  Importantly, the new leaders have no greater 
commitment to fundamentally change neoliberal economic policies than did any of 
their predecessors.  Yet under this economic regime, in the space of a few decades, 
Poland has been transformed from a relatively equal society in terms of educational 
attainment, income, and job opportunities, into a nation with extremely high levels of 
unemployment and income inequality.  This stark change in material relationships 
would seem to mobilize voter support for an expanded social safety net that would 
hold inequalities in check.  How, then, has the primary political allegiance of many 
Poles come to be claimed instead by Catholic nationalism?  What forces, economic, 
social, and political, are associated with the resonance of this ideology?     
As an American social scientist, I find this situation compelling for study 
because it seems to parallel some recent social developments in my own country.  The 
income gap continues to yawn before us, and seems to be widening at an ever-quicker 
pace, yet the ideology of the far political Right claims more support than ever before.  
Thatcher’s Britain underwent a similarly counterintuitive process of broad cross-class 
support for liberal management of the economy.  Although Poland’s historical 
experience has been much different from these two, its more recent macro-structural 
changes and the resulting realignment of social identities and values provide a more 
suitable empirical environment for studying what may be a similar social 
phenomenon.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Ideological Change During and After Major Social Transformations 
 
Economic disparities are very real in Poland.  Yet as the recent elections 
suggest, we have not seen that economic losers are connecting their political behavior 
with their economic situation through voting based on material interests.  As 
unemployment and income inequality have risen, so has the share of votes garnered by 
the Right—reaching nearly 70 percent in 2005. Considering the Right’s successful 
campaign platform, it seems likely that ideology, not interest, is shaping political 
behavior; in particular, conservative/authoritarian ideologies.  Much has been written 
about the role of competing ideologies in shaping societies that have recently 
undergone major social change.  Some, such as Goldstone (1991), Moaddel (1991), 
and Skocpol (1979), argue that dominant ideologies develop during the process and 
immediate aftermath of revolution, and become structurally located in political 
programs, further shaping society in a new ideological direction.  Others such as 
Swidler (1986) and Sewell (1986) agree that ideological success is essential in 
determining the character of post-change society, but propose that its resonance is 
based on cultural heritage—vague background assumptions and values that inform 
social action—not consciously articulated political programs.1   
Adherents of both perspectives call for further theorization of the connection 
between the ideologies operating in these “unsettled periods” with the ideological 
environments of subsequent “settled periods.”  Does revolutionary structural change 
necessarily provoke ideological change, or does culture act as durable underpinning 
resistant, in the long term, to macro-social variations? In Swidler’s words, “does 
                                                
1 For more on this debate, see Burns (1996) on the Iranian revolution. 
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culture account for continuities in action independent of structural circumstance” (p. 
283)?  These are highly simplified scenarios, but they present the broader parameters 
into which this study will fit.    
In the context of an often-vitriolic nationalist ideological construction of the 
Polish identity, it is important to establish the continuous or discontinuous character of 
this ideological theme in order to understand the connection between large-scale 
structural change and apparent cultural shifts.  More specifically, this work uses 
political action as lens to explore why people make choices that seem to favor durable 
ideal interests over evolving material interests, by shedding light on the interaction 
between economic circumstance, historical-cultural experience, and ideology.  In 
doing so, this work may contribute to knowledge of the connection between 
globalization and neoliberalism and the rise of rightist and populist groups 
worldwide—a connection which, as indicated by Greskovits (2007) and others, lacks a 
fully understood causal directionality.  
 
The Rise of the Right in Post-Socialist Societies 
 
The rise of right-wing ideologies in the post-socialist societies of Central and 
Eastern Europe has been well documented.  The “Right” is not a universal category: 
there are many “Rights” because societies have diverse historical and cultural 
circumstances.    Generally, the right in CE Europe is associated with a few 
ideological themes: nationalism, which can be understood as a defensive tie of 
identity, through either citizenship or ethnicity, to a geographically defined state where 
these two characteristics are presumed or forced to correspond (Verdery 1996: 84); 
and authoritarianism, which is related to nationalism in its assertion of strict 
boundaries for roles and identities (such as patriarchalism), its rejection of pluralism, 
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and its subordination of individuals to collectives.  Social conservatism and religious 
traditionalism are often associated with this ideological matrix.  Anti-corruption 
rhetoric may also be used by the right-wing in a symbolic return to values and 
community.  This study of Poland will use many of these terms interchangeably to 
refer to an ideological matrix that includes aspects of each.   
An understanding of the Right must also take into account the economic 
circumstances of a nation and the material relationships within that nation.  In a 
landmark overview of the Right in Europe, Kitschelt has concluded that contemporary 
postindustrial democracies generate a demand for ethnocentric, authoritarian, and free 
market liberal appeals that “is not evenly distributed across the entire population but is 
more likely to surface among social groups characterized by distinctive experiences 
and deprivations of life chances” (1995: p. 5); in particular, low-skilled workers and 
the less educated.  Studies by Swyngedouw (1994) and Kreisi (1999) support this 
finding, which is joined by Swank and Betz’s contention that the right-wing populist 
parties meeting this political demand “typically embrace neoliberal economic 
programs, xenophobia, and strident anti-establishment positions” (2002: p. 218).2  
This study will take these understandings of the “supply” and “demand” as a starting 
point for an analysis of the Right’s rise in Poland. 
Scholars disagree on these ideologies’ origins, as well as their role in the 
overthrow and aftermath of socialism.  One long-dominant line of theory concerning 
nationalist-type ideologies in CE Europe contends that they are deeply rooted in some 
or many these societies, and were in effect “frozen” during the socialist period, only to 
reemerge after democratic and market transitions.  In other words, the relative equality 
fostered by socialism’s policies of redistribution represents an aberration from the 
                                                
2 In Poland, the Right generally embraces a flat tax system and continued privatization, but certain 
parties (League of Polish Families, Law and Justice) use a more populist rhetoric that calls for a “return 
of the state” (Rupnik 2007).  
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more hierarchical and exclusionist tendencies of its subjects.  Korbonski’s (1993) 
analysis of the Right in modern Polish history follows this narrative; the Right is seen 
as a continuous ideological theme constitutive of the Polish identity particularly 
powerful during times of economic uncertainty but occasionally overshadowed by 
discrete era-specific rises of the Center and Leftist tides.  Greskovits (2007) adds that 
some Baltic states like Latvia and Estonia were highly exclusionary before economic 
restructuring’s effects played out.   
The renewed dominance of this theme in Polish society would here be seen as 
a “natural” response to the ideological freedom available after the dismantling of 
repressive socialism.  In this understanding of the Polish situation, revolutionary 
ideology was successful because it cleaved to existing cultural values—thus culture 
does account for continuities in action independent of structural circumstance; 
reorganization of society’s “base” does not fundamentally alter its “superstructure”.  If 
this analysis of nationalism/ authoritarianism in Poland were correct (“Scenario A”), 
we would expect polling data after the socialist period (when data became available) 
to show consistent strong support for nationalist-type responses to questions of 
identity and politics (support for traditionalist/religious values, distrust of minorities 
within and without Poland, distrust of the EU or EU accession, etc.), regardless of 
economic or employment status, and corresponding votes for political candidates who 
espouse these values.    
Alternatively, Verdery (1996) argues that socialism enhanced a nationalist 
consciousness that had been inculcated during 19th-century movements by 
encouraging ethnic solidarity, a collectivist discourse, and dependency on a patriarchal 
state.  In maintaining organized shortage, the state caused sharing of resources to be 
restricted to close personal networks, thus tightening ethnic boundaries and social 
homogeneity.  In a study of Polish nationalism, Hann (1998) follows Verdery in 
 8   
agreeing that the nationalist potential was fortified under socialism by both the Church 
and the political elite who wanted to focus loyalties in appropriate directions: the “us 
vs. them” rhetoric.  Although both scholars reject as Western stereotyping and 
determinism the idea that post-socialist nationalism results from “ancient hatreds,” 
their approaches also imply that there is some ideological continuity from the pre- to 
post-transformation period.   
 
 
Figure 1 Predicted History of Nationalist Ideology: Continuous and 
Discontinuous Scenarios 
 
This view might see the openness to foreign influence associated with 
liberalism as incongruent with the nationalist idea.  Europeanization and 
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cosmopolitanism may represent a disruption of traditional religious, family, and ethnic 
values.  Market reforms represent a dismantling of the social protections afforded the 
unified national “family,” and supplant affective ties with economic competition.  The 
initially successful political programs articulated by Solidarity—anti-
Communism/pro-capitalism—resonated with social ideals of unity and mapped onto 
the understood rhetoric of “us vs. them.”  Yet once full comprehension of liberalism’s 
effects took hold, nationalist/populist values became politically resonant once again.  
“Winning” revolutionary ideologies did not persist because they were less socially 
powerful than deep-rooted cultural values.   
If this analysis (“Scenario B”) were correct, we would expect strong voting for 
liberal candidates along with a high proportion of conservative-type responses to 
questions of identity and values, during and immediately after the reform period.  A 
congruence between nationalistic ideologies and right-wing votes, particularly among 
the economically insecure (who benefit less from neoliberalism), would be expected 
by the “settled period” of late reform to the present time.  As in Scenario A, culture is 
only superficially, not fundamentally, affected by structural circumstance; causal 
directionality (nationalism persisting throughout macro-social changes like market 
reform) remains the same under theories of ideological continuity. 
A third, more nuanced understanding of the rise in nationalist constructions of 
identity contradicts this “persistence theorizing” altogether, and perceives this 
ideology—or, to be more precise, its dominance in society—as essentially new, 
provoked by the jarring experience of post-socialism itself.  Revolutionary ideology 
appealed to some aspects of Polish culture, but other values have since been called 
upon in a reinterpretation of revolution’s meaning.  Politicians and religious 
authorities capable of shaping the social field deploy symbols—such as an ethnic ideal 
or a shared history—that culturally resonate with people, in order to justify a discourse 
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of exclusion and blaming that helps the economically marginalized make sense of 
their circumstances.  Culture is not a monolith; while certain values can be seen as 
deep-rooted, they do not constitute an all-encompassing system that consistently 
directs action throughout changing circumstances. This more “discontinuous” 
understanding of ideology sees the Right’s recent organization of certain values into a 
coherent basis for voting action as highly contingent on circumstance.  The erosions of 
security and certainty that have accompanied macro-structural change have made 
some culturally-based responses particularly attractive right now.  This explanation 
creates a theoretical causal chain between neoliberalism and conservative nationalism: 
the latter is an effect of the former.   
If this explanation (“Scenario C”) were correct, early reform-period ideological 
preferences and voting would be relatively patternless, at least through the lenses used 
by this study.  But we would see a sharp rise among the economically insecure in 
nationalist-type responses and votes from the late reform period through the present.  
The well-off would be less attracted to these new defensive right-wing ideologies 
because they would feel less threatened by the structural changes brought by 
liberalism.  Scholarly analyses of this approach will be explored in more detail below.    
 
Growing Income Inequality Under Marketization 
 
How and why have ideological constructions of identity taken hold of Polish 
people in the post-socialist period?  As noted above, many scholars believe that 
economic uncertainty is deeply implicated in this process.  Income inequality has risen 
in many of the post-socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe, but is 
particularly marked in Poland.  The country exhibits the highest level of income 
inequality in CEE Europe: from 1987 to 1990, its Gini coefficient stood at 0.28; from 
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1996 to 1999 that figure had risen to 0.33 (World Bank 2000).  Macro-structural 
changes in the Polish economy, such as the lifting of price controls, the cutting of 
subsidies for basic commodities, and the deregulation of state-run enterprises were 
expected to quickly transition the country into a Western-style market economy.  
Poland’s rapid implementation of reforms did increase GDP and foreign investment 
quite markedly, but at the same time, poverty and unemployment rates grew unabated.  
Today, Poland has the highest rate of unemployment in the EU, at 19.4% in 2005 
(Paczynska 2005).   
 
Table 2 The Unemployment Rate in Percentages 
 
  
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Unemployment 
rate  
0.3 6.6 12.1 14.2 16.7 16.1 15.4 13.1 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Unemployment 
rate 
10.7 11.4 13.7 15.7 18.1/ 
20.1 
18.6/ 
20.6 
20.6 19.4 
Source: Data from the Central Statistical Office (GUS), http://www.stat.gov.pl/. 
Note: Numbers in bold reflect the new method of calculating unemployment by GUS that 
began in 2001. 
 
 
Scholars debate the manner in which these structural changes have caused 
inequality and social stratification.  One explanation attributes the growth of inequality 
to economic takeover (particularly in post-Communist Russia) by a dominant social 
class made up of former Party managers and technocratic elites, who have used the 
market system to siphon large amounts of money into their own pockets in sometimes 
dubious ways (Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley 1998).  This view singles out a definite 
mechanism by which market reform has allowed some to prosper and others to 
struggle.  While this phenomenon may indeed be widespread, it allows political parties 
to continue using a familiar line about the need for lustration—weeding out the 
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corruption that is the continued legacy of Communism.  In this view, individual-level 
fixes can be made without substantial changes to the economic system itself.   
In a well-known debate, Burawoy (2001) criticizes Eyal et al. for overlooking 
the possibility of alternatives to neoliberal capitalism in their diagnosis of the 
economic troubles facing post-socialist societies.  An “end of history”-type scholarly 
analysis of post-socialism contains its own self-fulfilling prophecy, in constraining the 
range of ideological alternatives that people are presented with by leaders.  When 
market liberalism is presented as the only successful economic program, social 
problems that arise will merely be attributed to its inadequate application, or as we 
will see, to other “scapegoat” sources.  In Poland, various political parties throughout 
the 1990s adhered to the former explanation with success, but most have seen their 
political fortunes wane in the most recent elections as Poles preferred candidates 
proposing primarily social remedies to these problems.  It would seem that the initially 
resonant explanation for inequality—market distortion—no longer carries the same 
weight.  
A simpler and more reasonable explanation is that certain actors entered the 
post-socialist period with more resources than others, and were able to reproduce these 
resources for themselves and their children, creating the system of material 
relationships we would expect in a bourgeois capitalist society.  As the money 
economy became more entrenched, the skills required to succeed in the new economy 
were less available and became more expensive; in addition, job creation became 
concentrated in the cities.  This process has resulted in a society essentially bifurcated 
along the lines of a well-off educated urban population and a poor less-educated 
population of small towns and rural areas (Paczynska 2005).  Analyses of inequality in 
Poland would also be remiss in ignoring its strongly gendered aspect: Brown and 
Schafft (2003) find that throughout Central and Eastern Europe (but in Poland and 
 13   
Hungary especially), women are one of the most marginalized groups, and especially 
rural women; they are increasingly concentrated in the unemployed or low wage/low 
skill sectors of the economy.  Not just a temporary phenomenon, the rise in inequality 
has resulted in long-term poverty that is not decreasing with the progress in reforms.     
If an ideological construction of Polish identity is a new development, why has 
it arisen now and what is its link with the current economic environment?  One of the 
foremost scholars to analyze the relationship between economic liberalism and 
political illiberalism in Poland is David Ost (2005), who argues that nationalist parties 
have been successful in the “organization of anger.”  The post-socialist economy has 
produced a society where inequality, rather than unity and common circumstance, is 
the new norm, yet politically, neither the right nor the left have been able to address 
the anger and frustration caused by neoliberalism.  And, even those politicians who 
have presented domestic policy solutions have sometimes been tainted by corruption, 
rendering voters suspicious of their motives and effectiveness.  Anti-Communism and 
anti-corruption have been useful strategies through which to displace anger for quite a 
while; the momentous event of joining the EU probably also stayed Polish 
uncertainties about the new direction.  The bare fact has remained, however, that 
unemployment and income inequality persist under the new system.  In absolute 
terms, Poles may be better or worse off than they were under socialism—but under 
that system their struggles issued from a well-understood and universally vilified 
“enemy.”  They did not have control over their economic well-being, but at least they 
knew why.   
Arjun Appadurai (2006) believes this political phenomenon is not limited to 
the former socialist countries, and although transnational generalization is beyond the 
scope of this paper, his work may help make sense of the Polish situation.  Appadurai 
sees globalization as the most pertinent macro-social force motivating universalism 
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and inclusion/exclusion: the modern state exists in extreme social uncertainty as a 
result of destabilizing global flows of people and capital.  At no other time in history 
have these flows been so completely out of the realm of domestic control, and so 
utterly lacking figures of accountability.  This historically irregular (yet geographically 
widespread) development leads Appadurai to conclude that “the virtual loss of even 
the fiction of a national economy leaves the cultural field as the main one in which 
fantasies of purity, authenticity, borders, and security can be enacted” (23).  Cultural 
tradition is seen as the last bulwark against the disintegration of national pride, dignity, 
and sovereignty.         
Pockets of nationalism will arise in even the most cosmopolitan societies that 
can exercise at least some control over the macro-economic terms of globalization.  In 
places where economic control seems farthest from reach—underdeveloped or 
struggling economies—these ideological tendencies resonate among greater portions 
of the citizenry.  This understanding of globalization’s effects seems to suggest a 
fatalistic view, on the part of disadvantaged citizens, of the voter’s right and 
responsibility to push for policy solutions to socio-economic problems.    
Ost suggests that, in the absence of state control over macro-economic 
conditions, what the Right has provided to directionless voters is an ideological 
scapegoat: its brand of nationalism and populism directs inchoate anger in a very 
concrete way towards homosexuals, non-Catholics, nontraditional women, and other 
markers of cosmopolitan Europeanism and divergence from a Polish ethnic ideal that 
had some pre-existing cultural value.  This approach goes a long way toward 
explaining the appeal of authoritarian political ideologies in a nation that struggled 
violently against authoritarianism in the form of Communism.  Without a clear 
economic target for their frustrations, Poles have latched on to social targets.  This 
view maps onto the idea put forth above, that the ideological deployment of nationalist 
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and traditionalist sentiments is fairly new—a worldview that was not unearthed by the 
dismantling of socialism, but was provoked by events and powerful symbol-shapers 
like cultural and political leaders (Church figures, politicians, etc.).  And, it has shaped 
Polish political behavior—voting—around issues of identity, rather than issues of 
interest.  This study will use data to engage specifically with this explanation for the 
rise of the Right in Poland, first presenting existing theory to explore why it might 
make more sense than the other explanations presented above. 
 
Economic Interests and Political Choice 
 
Political leaders may be unable to control macro-economic policy in a 
globalized world; as we have seen, Poland’s unemployment level has persisted 
throughout social democratic and centrist regimes.  Certainly, though, domestic 
economic policies can affect the welfare of disadvantaged groups like the 
unemployed.  The far-right wing parties that were recently elected campaigned 
primarily on identity issues—traditional family values, anti-Semitism and anti-
homosexuality, etc.—while asserting a variety of micro-economic policies that are not 
much different from those offered by the more liberal parties.  Why would Polish 
voters choose parties that spoke first and foremost to issues of identity, then?   And, if 
the unemployed are stronger supporters of the Right, as Kitschelt (1995) and my 
predictions suggest, why might this be so?   
Before exploring why voters might choose platforms that appeal primarily to 
identity and cultural values, it is worth noting that scholars are still trying to 
understand interest-based voting.  Much has been written about the declining 
connection between material interests and voter choice, beginning with Lipset’s 
seminal study (1981).  Lipset’s “decline of class” theory was followed throughout the 
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‘90s and ‘00s with similar conclusions by Inglehart (1997), Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 
(1999), and Rueschemeyer and Mahoney (2000). On the other hand, studies by Evans 
et al. (1991, 1996), Hout et al. (1995), Goldthorpe (1996), and Brooks and Manza 
(1997) have painted a more complex picture, finding either “trendless fluctuation” or a 
continued polarization of voting patterns by social class coupled with a changing 
mixture of preferences associated with each particular class.  These scholars cast doubt 
onto the familiar image of leftist voting by the disadvantaged. 
However, some scholars continue to interpret vote choice as a relatively simple 
function of the economic interests of “rational actors.”  In a 1997 study, Bell finds a 
strong relationship between unemployment rates and voting in the period from 1992-
1995 in Poland, in that the rise in support for the Democratic Left Alliance is closely 
related to the rise in joblessness across time and its variation across regions (Bell 
reminds us that in the Polish political system the parliament and the cabinet are main 
loci of policy making).  Bell follows Evans’ and Whitefield’s 1994 study of Russian 
voting behavior among economic winners and losers, where they asked  
whether the loss of electoral support for the most pro-reform parties should be 
understood as a protest vote or as part of an iterative progression towards interest-led 
voting. A protest vote would indicate that the electorate has accepted democratic and 
market principles but nevertheless votes to express a general dissatisfaction with the 
manner in which reforms have been enacted. On the other hand, if democratization 
involves a learning process on the part of both voters and politicians, a greater 
diversification of the vote may indicate that voters who were initially ignorant of the 
implications of radical economic reform have gained experience and gradually come 
to identify their interests and learn how to vote accordingly (Bell, p. 1263). 
This approach assumes that post-socialist voters who are initially unclear as to 
which political platforms support their economic interests will grow more savvy over 
time, as policy effects pan out, and will abandon the temporary guidance of cultural 
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rhetoric.  Evans and Whitefield’s “iterative voting,” which Bell also claims to find in 
Poland through 1995, proposes that interest-based political behavior persists despite a 
powerful line of scholarly argument that announces the replacement of interest-
motivators with identity- or cultural-motivators.  Iterative voting theory presumes that 
voting behavior is similar to market behavior, with actors seeking to maximize their 
material benefit (taking into account both their individual self-interest and a certain 
lesser amount of public interest, particularly among one’s social strata) (Bell, p. 1263).  
If Bell’s iterative voting analysis were correct, we would expect to see support for the 
left-wing party rise among the economically disadvantaged in tandem with social 
stratification and unabated joblessness, as these voters increasingly understand how 
their interests are tied to particular domestic economic platforms; identity issues would 
be of secondary concern here.  In keeping with Scenario C, I hypothesize that this is 
not the case, because the Right’s influence is growing in tandem with joblessness.   
 
Material and Ideal Interests 
 
Besides this apparent lack of empirical support for the iterative voting 
explanation, it is also somewhat unsatisfactory in its seeming implication of “false 
consciousness” on the part of Polish economic losers.  Beginning with Althusser, 
social scientists have come to reject the phenomenon of false consciousness as overly 
simplistic and deterministic.  They have suggested instead that voters’ preferences are 
shaped by culturally-created ideologies that are set by the parameters of their 
economic situation.  An exploration of this theoretical line of thinking, beginning with 
Marx, will be instructive here in showing how theorists can understand the complexity 
of interest-based action (namely, voting behavior), without implying that “people 
don’t know what’s good for them.” 
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Ideology gives actors the tools to understand their circumstances and their 
relation to the rest of society.  Marx and postmarxists of all stripes have struggled to 
understand the connection between ideology and material social relationships.  Marx 
himself presents contradictory formulations in two of his most influential works, “The 
German Ideology” and “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.”  In the former, 
he proposes that consciousness is determined, in a neutral and empirical fashion, by 
social relationships based on material conditions.  Thus, society’s “ruling ideas are 
nothing more than the expression of the dominant material relationships” (1978 
[1932]: 172): the ruling class dominates ideological production, presenting its own 
interests as the “common interest,” and distorts workers’ perceptions of their 
circumstances.  As long as these actors remain unorganized as a class, they will 
remain trapped by false consciousness.  In this sense, one should expect, as Evans and 
Whitefield and Bell do, a progressively greater understanding of true material interests 
among the working class and the poor as Central and Eastern European countries 
move from Communism’s bureaucratic collectivization and statism to class-based 
capitalist organization and a diminished degree of state control.  Policy demands 
corresponding to economic interests would bifurcate along class lines: economic elites 
would be expected to elect officials encouraging privatization, the free market, tax 
cuts; the working class and the poor would elect officials standing for domestic 
policies of redistribution, progressive taxation, and social service provisions.  Insofar 
as members of a class are cognizant of their interests as-a-class, they will rationally act 
in their own benefit and formulate corresponding worldviews.   
However, historical events unfolded in Marx’s time which spurred him to 
rethink his understanding of the social bases of ideology.  As Marx came to realize 
through Louis Bonaparte’s election to power, which he relates in “The Eighteenth 
Brumaire,” ideologies are composed of more than objective material interests; 
 19   
contingent and unexpected factors are also implicated in class-based behavior.  During 
the Revolution, Bonaparte was politically allied with the economic interests of the 
bourgeoisie—although he tried to portray himself as “the patriarchal benefactor of all 
classes” (1978 [1932]: 616)—and the peasants voted overwhelmingly for him without 
any assurance that he would improve their lot.  This upended Marx’s strictly 
deterministic view of history, whereby the proletariat would assert class interests in 
revolutionary action.  Rather, the peasants seemed to have voted on the basis of 
closely-held symbolic values articulated by a powerful voice in the political sphere.  
Louis had presented himself as the successor to the Napoleonic tradition, an important 
source of French national pride shared by both bourgeoisie and proletariat.  In the 
absence of any clear counter-motivator, the peasants voted against economic interest 
on the basis of ideology, on the basis of the idée napoleonienne.  Here, we see that 
ideology is not merely a neutral matter of “true” versus “false” material interests; 
people hold other, less tangible values that motivate their behavior too and can 
contradict objective class interests.   
How, then, are we to reconcile the connection between ideology, false 
consciousness, and material social relationships?  This question is particularly apt 
since the contemporary literature has been dominated by those who doubt that 
instrumental class interests form the basis of political behavior.  A number of 
postmarxist thinkers will be instructive in furthering an understanding of this issue.  
Althusser (1984), for one, dismissed the idea of false consciousness in favor of a more 
discursive understanding of ideologies; the discourses we are involved in and 
subjected to create certain ideological frameworks from which we cannot escape 
through education or willed consciousness.  In other words, there is no complete de-
mystification or removing of veils because ideologies always-already interpellate 
every subject.  While Althusser’s approach removes the intellectual elitism underlying 
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the false consciousness theory, it does not prove satisfactory in forging a conceptual 
relationship between ideology and social class.  Laclau’s (1977) work builds on 
Althusser, but goes further in its suggestion that non-class ideologies could be 
articulated with class but not reducible to class (see Barrett 1991), as with popular 
political discourses that appeal to the working class but not only or necessarily to the 
working class. 
Stuart Hall’s reading of Gramsci sheds perhaps even more light on this 
relationship.  Applied initially to working-class support for conservative/nationalist 
Thatcherism in Britain, Hall looked at the intersection of power, culture, and economic 
situation in ideological formation.  Gramsci had previously theorized the process of 
hegemony, whereby dominant actors employ both coercion and the organization of 
consent in order to consolidate ideologies that mostly, but not exclusively, serve 
dominant interests.  Hall explored “the ways in which popular consent can be so 
constructed…as to harness to its support some popular discontents, neutralize the 
opposing forces, disaggregate the opposition and really incorporate some strategic 
elements of popular opinion into its own hegemonic project” (1985: 118).  Thatcherist 
ideology drew on truly resonant themes for many Britons—nation, family, race, duty, 
authority, traditionalism, patriarchalism—managing to “stitch up or ‘unify’” these 
themes with the contradictory neoliberal elements of its discourse (1985: 122).  In this 
way, Hall showed how power is central in ideological construction, but people are 
consenting too; although their class-based interests may not be served, other 
compelling interests are addressed and come to appear equally valuable.  
Thatcher’s Conservative Party reshaped the entire cultural understanding of 
British society, in sidestepping class and creating political constructions of other 
central aspects of the British national identity—family, race, ethnicity.  Identity ceased 
to be specifically organized around class, to use Ost’s (2005) phrasing, although class 
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distinctions did not cease to have validity for social action and perspective.  In this 
sense, Gramscian hegemony continues to structure ideology, but on broader fronts 
than a purely class-based hegemony would be able to infiltrate.  Hall endorses a 
connection between class and ideas, but refutes determinism: the economic cannot 
provide the contents of the thoughts of particular social classes, nor can it fix certain 
ideas to certain classes.  “The determinacy of the economic for the ideological can, 
therefore, be only in terms of the former setting the limits for the terrain of 
operations,” the terrain of thought (1996 [1986]: 44).    
Through this perspective, we may understand ideology in a more complex 
way: individuals who act against their apparent class interests, or who abandon 
favorable policy solutions for rhetoric that appeals to identity issues, are not merely 
victims of false consciousness; rather, they are influenced by the politically and 
culturally powerful, and they are also complicit in the creation and legitimation of 
these discourses drawing upon cultural values and meaningful aspects of identity.  
Their particular “communicative experiences and capabilities” (Kitschelt 1995: p. 7) 
provide more or less fertile ground for certain ideological explanations of their 
circumstances.  Seen this way, an analysis pointing to the political “organization of 
anger” presents much more nuance and richness than false consciousness explanations 
can attain.   
 
The Resonance of Right-Wing Ideology Among the Economically Insecure 
 
Ideological constructions of identity must intuitively resonate with actors’ 
understandings of their situations.  As noted by Hall, above, ideological developments 
speak to real conditions and experiences, and then recast them in new terms.  The 
general social mood in Poland is fairly gloomy, and the opinion that the country is 
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heading in a wrong direction has visibly prevailed for the past seven years.  The Right 
has newly cast this problem as a social issue, and has drawn upon some constant 
threads in Polish cultural heritage to construct the Polish identity as a long-standing 
totality that has recently come under attack from outside forces who threaten to 
undermine the nation’s unity and seize economic advantages at the expense of “real” 
Poles.  Although this view certainly does not resonate with all Poles, it has caught on 
with enough of the population for a majority to vote the Right into power; the question 
is, who constitutes that majority—is it the economically marginalized, as suggested by 
Kitschelt (1995) and predicted by this study?   
In reality, there has never been “one Poland,” nor one unified Polish culture, 
but certain historical factors make plausible this explanation of the current situation.  
Poland has one of the most complicated histories in Europe: the land area was 
occupied by multiple nationalities until the conclusion of World War II, when its 
borders were moved inward, decreasing the size of the country and forcing the 
migration of millions of formerly coexistent groups, primarily Poles, Germans, 
Ukrainians, and Jews.  For the first time in its history, national borders mapped more 
or less directly onto “ethnic” Polish borders.  The idea of a unified ethnic nation is 
often the source of nationalist identity construction, but the strength of this identity is 
dependent on the presence of outsiders to reinforce group boundaries.  A relative lack 
of ethnic minorities has not reduced anti-Semitic sentiment; nationalist Poles have also 
singled out other marginalized groups, such as homosexuals, to fill the role of “Other” 
and have demonized them to a great extent.  
National sovereignty is another aspect of the new ideology that draws on 
historical experiences and recasts them in new terms that can make sense of 
contemporary circumstances.  The country has always had a tempestuous relationship 
with its neighbors, such as Germany and Russia, who constituted real threats during 
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the 20th century.  A Romantic consciousness of Poland as a “heroic victim of tsarist 
tyranny” (Lukowski and Zawadzki 2001: 136)—a unified moral community striving 
toward self-determination despite partitioning attempts by Prussia and Austria—had 
already emerged by the mid-19th century.  Russification and Germanization policies 
imposed on the peasantry through the early 20th century only intensified sentiments of 
traditional Polishness.  Although Poland voted to join the EU, suspicion of its 
neighbors remains high, and the protection of national sovereignty is a powerful theme 
in the nationalist ideology.  Some observers believe that EU accession has increased 
the political leverage of euroskepticism because the danger of its “overeffectiveness” 
is gone (Sprinz 2007).  Most of the political parties that won representation in the 
Polish parliament in the 2005 elections espouse some degree of protectionism against 
perceived enemies outside their borders (Germany and Russia are the most-often cited 
enemies, but the EU in general is believed to have interests contrary to that of Poland), 
and criticism of the Social Democrats who agreed to unfavorable accession conditions.  
Anti-Communism is another powerful cultural theme that has more recent 
roots in the Polish people’s history.  Its complex ideological resonance will not be 
fully explored here, but it must be noted that a key aspect of right-wing anti-
Communist rhetoric today has to do with anti-corruption and political legitimacy.  
Communism created an environment where bribery and position-wielding were the 
norm, resulting in lasting suspicion of political elites.  Persistent corruption scandals in 
many of the Central and Eastern European countries reinforced these sentiments and 
provided fuel for populist and conservative movements.  As Culik (2000) notes, 
“kicking the Communist corpse” became an expedient source of political legitimacy 
among leaders in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.  Although the initial fear 
that Communism would return if reforms were not quickly undertaken has lost 
political steam, emotions toward Communism continue to be manipulated as a 
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substitute for governing administrations’ economic legitimacy.  As noted above, Eyal 
et al. (1998) have produced convincing and influential studies specifically connecting 
the legacy of Communism to contemporary circumstances of economic inequality, by 
giving credence to the idea that former Russian Communist elites have translated their 
political power into economic power.  But it does not seem that the Polish right-wing 
has yet made such an explicit causal connection between Communism and economic 
inequality; rather the former is used as an emotional displacement for anger and 
confusion over the latter.  This cultural theme does not penetrate as deeply into Polish 
heritage, so it cannot be understood as “frozen” under the socialist system (as Scenario 
A proposes), but it can be regarded through the analytic lens of ideological continuity. 
The most significant cultural/historical theme to consider in light of this 
question of ideological continuity however, is the role of the Catholic Church.  Like 
ethnic homogeneity and protection from outside enemies, the Church has always been 
one of the more central aspects of Polishness, although an ideological construction of 
the national identity has not been politically deployed until recently.  How has this 
particular cultural theme been utilized in this project?   
Again, the Church does have long-standing historical roots in Poland, so its use 
as a defining element of the nation resonates quite strongly.  As early as the 19th 
century, the Church was able to create a symbolic role for itself as the main agent of 
Polish national identity.  Because partitioning prevented political unity at this point, a 
coherent identity became tied to ethnic culture and mythologized history (Mach 2000), 
of which the Church was the focal point.  Its role was somewhat repressed during the 
socialist era, but it was never banned and provided a sort of emotional haven from the 
omnipresent state for many Poles.  In this sense, it was actually highly inclusive in 
membership, and represented a sense of belonging to European civilization, as 
opposed to Soviet, atheist “foreignness.”  Today, 96% of Poles identify themselves as 
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Catholic, and religion is by far the most respected and trusted institution in Polish life, 
considered more important than education, patriotism, friendship, freedom of speech 
or wealth (CBOS May 2006).  This role in society means that conservative cultural 
values—on such questions as abortion, women’s role in society, religious education, 
homosexuality, etc.—have deep roots in the Polish identity.  
Yet the Solidarity movement during democratization fostered openness, civic 
freedom, and pluralist democracy, without negating the Catholic element of 
Polishness.  It seems that only recently have these social values become the basis for 
decidedly illiberal political behavior, after the liberalism initially espoused during the 
reform period.  After Solidarity overthrew the socialist government, maintaining 
power throughout the democratically formative years of the next decade, it began to 
strengthen heretofore latent political links with the Church.  As Ost (2005) notes, this 
right-wing alliance was easily able to turn “‘Communists’ as the enemy…into ‘others’ 
as the enemy, meaning ‘non-Catholics’ or ‘non-believers’” (72).  During the drafting 
of the Constitution in 1996, the right-wing parties that were the progeny of Solidarity 
fought to base the document on Christian values and Catholic traditions, and to abolish 
the separation of church and state.  Polish perceptions of their country’s entry into the 
EU were also shaped by a powerful religious influence that warned against both the 
decadence and secularism of European culture, and the threat to sovereign Polish 
decision-making.   
More recently, the Catholic radio network Radio Maryja, considered intolerant 
“hate radio” by many observers in the EU, played a central role in advocating for the 
right-wing parties that won control of the parliament.  It seems that the Church has 
taken advantage of its entrenched cultural role to insert itself into political matters.  It 
can offer no solutions to the economic problems that many Poles face today (although 
it does express unease about the moral looseness associated with a market economy), 
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but it does provide a means for right-wing political leaders to organize anger on a 
social or ideological basis.  Although the vast majority of Poles share the religious 
perspective of the Church, certain members of society may vote on the basis of these 
perspectives even when doing so is unlikely or uncertain to improve their material 
circumstances.  These are not actions of a falsely conscious society; rather, people are 
responding to the only voices organizing their deep uncertainty and anger 
“productively,” since market liberalism has become both domestically and globally 
inviolable.  Thus, the recurrent and rising connection between economic liberalism 
and political illiberalism.  
 
The Unemployed Vote in Poland   
 
This study will look at the vote behavior of the unemployed in Poland, 
asserting that they exemplify the situation of those who have lost out in the post-
socialist transformation.  The unemployed and the poor are not necessarily congruent 
categories, because many of the poorest members of post-socialist societies are those 
who have withdrawn from active job-seeking, such as elderly pensioners and women 
who have removed themselves from the workforce to rear children or adhere to 
domesticity ideals (see Schafft and Brown 2003).  For the purposes of this study, 
unemployed survey respondents will be broken down into 2 categories: those who 
have been unemployed and looking for a job for 1 to 12 months, and those who have 
been unemployed and looking for 12 to 60 months.  Of course, people falling into 
either unemployed category also tend to experience poverty at higher rates than their 
employed counterparts.  They are more likely to be deprived of other life chances as 
well, such as higher education and job-skills training.  They may also be concentrated 
in certain regions of the country that have lost industry and investment- rural areas and 
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eastern parts of Poland, for example (Ost 2005).  While my hypothesis makes specific 
predictions about unemployed voters, other structural factors—income, education, and 
region—will also be included as independent variables. These will be considered as 
separate by not unrelated measures of relative economic success under macro-social 
change.  Thus, if unemployment proves to be a poor predictor of voting while 
significant effects are associated with income, for example, I may be able to modify 
my hypothesis without abandoning its more fundamental premise that economic losers 
have become more likely to vote for the Right in the late reform period. 
Ost observes that even by the early ‘90s, “political solidarities built around 
interest had taken a back seat to solidarities built around identity” (1993: p. 3): 
because of culture’s profound role in political meaning-making, votes do not cohere 
around class consciousness.  Yet conditions of inequality are not absent from 
ideological constructions of identity and the political programs that precipitate.  From 
this perspective, the economically insecure are more likely to turn to nationalist 
identity constructions because this a more resonant way of processing their material 
circumstances.  Nationalist rhetoric in Polish politics taps deeply felt veins of 
“Polishness” along the lines of ethnicity, shared history, and religious values, and 
Poles who have lost out in the transition to neoliberal capitalism may be more 
receptive to such appeals because they speak more effectively to their frustrations than 
piecemeal policy solutions offered by sometimes-corrupt parties.  However, it is the 
skillful manipulation of right-wing leaders that translates these issues of identity and 
purity into the primary basis for political action.  As stated above, this explanation of 
the situation in Poland will be supported by a sharp rise in right-type votes and values 
after the initial reform period through the present, particularly among the unemployed 
or other groups of economically insecure voters.  No matter the data output, this study 
clearly cannot conclusively determine which scenario is operating in Poland, yet 
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findings buttressing this explanation would support my hypothesis and contribute to a 
useful theoretical mapping of the operation of ideology in Polish society.  
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DATA AND METHODS 
 
I use data from the Polish General Social Survey (PGSS), which has been 
administered through random multistage area sampling each year from 1992 to 2005.  
This data is accessible in English through 1999, from the Inter-university Consortium 
for Political and Social Research, and in Polish through 2005, through the University 
of Warsaw.  I use SPSS statistical software to analyze the PGSS data.   
I identify six variables that indicate support for aspects of a right-wing 
ideological matrix: nationalism, religious traditionalism, social conservatism, 
patriarchal values, anti-communism, and free market support.  I then recode these 5-
scale Likert-type variables categorically to condense them into more simple 3-scale 
measures, such that those expressing agreement or strong agreement with an 
ideological statement were recoded as “More [ideological],” those expressing 
disagreement or strong disagreement were recoded as “Less [ideological],” with a 
third category of “Not sure.”  For Nationalism, respondents expressed agreement or 
disagreement with the statement, “The world threatens the independence of Poland.”  
For Religious Traditionalism, respondents agreed or disagreed with the statement, 
“Churches in Poland have too much authority.”  For Social Conservatism, respondents 
were asked whether they felt homosexual relations were right or wrong.  For 
Patriarchalism, the question was whether it was better for men to work and women to 
stay at home.  For Anti-Communism, they were asked to characterize their feelings on 
communism as a socio-economic system, and for Free Market Support, they were 
asked to agree or disagree with the statement “Government should reduce income 
differentials.”   I then track support for each of them over the time span of 5 
parliamentary elections, using simple frequency analysis.  This will help me explore 
ideological continuity in Polish society immediately after structural change and as 
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these changes become “settled,” allowing me to propose broader conclusions on 
whether structural change fundamentally affects culture, or culture endures despite 
structural change. 
I also create a right/left voting matrix for each election year.  As a 
parliamentary democracy, Poland’s national election ballot includes many more 
parties than the simple Republican/Democrat/Independent ballot that we are familiar 
with in the US.  Many, especially “fringe” or single-issue parties that tend to garner 
less than 1% of the total vote, do not fit easily into a dichotomous right/left schema.  
However, the main vote-getters can generally be categorized as right or left based on 
stated political platforms and my consultation with an expert on Polish politics (David 
Ost, professor, Hobart and William Smith Colleges).  I create a separate right-left 
index for each election year to account for changing party names and coalitions: for 
example, I consider Solidarity left-wing in 1991 when it was the workers’ party, and I 
consider its descendent Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right right-wing in 2001 
because it has abandoned its labor associations and become more closely affiliated 
with the conservative Catholic Church.  Using these discrete indices, I then recode 
voters’ self-reported party choices for each election year into the appropriate right/left 
category.   
I compare the share of right-wing votes cast by level of adherence to the six 
different measures of right-wing ideology.  This part of my data analysis will help me 
understand the specific ideological bases for right-wing voting in Poland.  I cross-
tabulate each ideological position with vote choice for each election, then create odds 
ratios for each ideological variable to show the odds of voting for the Right based on 
ideological position.  I compute odds using base-2 log figures, which are symmetric 
about zero for ease of visual inspection; negative odds indicate a greater likelihood of 
voting for the Left, while positive odds indicate a greater likelihood of voting for the 
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Right.  I display odds over time to show changes in the effect of ideological preference 
on voting over time.  This will allow me to compare changing ideologies with 
changing voting behavior.  If the relationship between a particular ideology and a 
political platform remains consistent over time from the early through late reform 
period, this would provide support for Scenario B.  If an early relationship quickly 
dissolved as voters became more aware of the effects of their vote choices, this would 
provide evidence for Scenario A.  But if an ideological preference became associated 
with a political platform only in the most recent elections, this would indicate the 
creation of a new ideological theme in Polish society—a rupture with cultural 
arrangements of the past that no longer resonate in new structural circumstances. 
Bivariate tests like cross-tabulations suggest an association which may or may 
not persist in the more complete test for multivariate correlation; in part, this is 
because correlation coefficients are uncontrolled while regression coefficients are 
partial coefficients that control for other variables in the model (Garson 2007).  Thus I 
further refine my understanding of these relationships through multivariate analysis, 
which helps me build models of the predictor variables and the strength of their 
effects.  Because the dependent variable, Right to Left (Year) is dichotomous, I use 
binary logistic regression to demonstrate these effects because, unlike other 
multivariate methods like ordinary least squares regression, logistic regression 
calculates the odds of being in one response category rather than another.  Along with 
the six ideological predictor variables, I regress on survey respondents’ age group, 
region of residence, education level, employment status, and income, for 4 elections 
(voting data for the most recent election of 2005 is not available).  Using these control 
variables, I can establish whether right-wing voting is related to one’s structural 
position in society.  I build models with all variables, structural and ideological, that 
are significant at the 0.05 alpha-level for Pearson’s chi-square test.    
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These models aim to capture all of the significant factors that have influenced 
right-wing voting in Polish parliamentary elections.  A comparison of these factors 
over time may reveal permanence or change in the basis for right-wing support.  The 
effort to understand the changing relationship between values and political behavior, 
and to track them over a time period when Poland underwent major transformation 
and experienced its ongoing effects, can contribute to a broader understanding of 
social change in a the era of globalization.  As stated above, I expect to see that the 
ideological basis of right-wing voting has shifted from liberal, free market principles 
to conservative social values, with religious traditionalism remaining fairly constant 
throughout, and that the most ardently right-wing Poles today are the unemployed or 
poor.  While I have no expectations about the effect of any other demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics, it will be interesting to see if they come into play here.      
It is clear that there are quite a few limitations on the strength of any 
conclusions I may draw from this data analysis.  First and foremost, self-reported 
political behavior can often be less accurate than desired.  Questions purporting to 
measure ideological quotients may also be unreliable since they lack context: voters 
may express high levels of support for the Church, which may suggest submission to 
authority, but they may also strongly support anti-authoritarianism in other ways, such 
as anti-Communism.  It may be best to take each measure of ideology on face value 
and resist the urge to construct from these measures a full characterization of Polish 
society.  Besides for problems with the data, there is the matter of variable choice.  I 
can’t know that the variables I have chosen will actually measure anything real about 
Polish society—whether the PGSS questions I have chosen to operationalize each 
ideological theme will objectively capture any of them: ideologies like nationalism, 
patriarchalism, and so forth are complex and cannot be quantified by response to one 
survey question.  Yet the researcher must do the best she can with the data available, 
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providing justification for what may seem slightly arbitrary choices.  These questions 
used to operationalize each ideology were deemed the best options from the available 
PGSS data.  
Perhaps most importantly, I have never lived in Poland and do not speak the 
language, so I cannot hope to understand the cultural nuances that may give me an 
inaccurate perception of the country and the changes through which it has gone.  
However, I should clearly state that my intention in this study is not to provide in-
depth analysis of Polish culture but to provide statistical data that may support a 
general understanding of voting behavior in a particular setting.  I can hope that this 
study will provide a new theoretical map of Poland which may be of use to others who 
have a deeper understanding of that culture and its experience through time.   
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RESULTS 
 
The study tracked support for various aspects of a right-wing ideology over 
time; it also determined correlations between these support levels and voting behavior.  
As stated, independent variables were designated as appropriate measures of 
ideological sentiment.  Before reporting on any results, it must be noted that voter 
turnout in Polish parliamentary elections has been quite low throughout the entire 
post-socialist period, only reaching the 50% level once, in 1993.  Of those who did 
vote, they elected left-wing coalitions to power in 1991 and 1993, a right-wing 
coalition to power in 1997, then the left again in 2001, and most recently, the right in 
2005.  At the same time, the share of votes garnered by the Right has continued to rise 
throughout the period.  The drastic turnaround in 2005 (when the party of the Social 
Democrats achieved only 11.3% of votes) could be read as the disruption of a trend of 
left-wing voting, or it may be the resumption of a growing right-wing constituency 
briefly checked by the Left’s 2001 victory.  My study, as explained above, takes the 
latter perspective as its guiding assumption, since each election year since 
Communism has seen a new decline in the Left’s margin of victory.  
Tracking aspects of right-wing ideology over time, we note that, on the whole, 
Poland remains a conservative, religious country as compared with what we might 
expect for the Western European states and even the US.  This finding provides initial 
support for the “ideological continuity” hypothesis presented in earlier sections—the 
Right as a continuous ideological theme constitutive of the Polish identity.  Yet there 
are some changes over time, as Table 3 shows.  Nationalist sentiment has actually 
been falling since its peak in 1993, with a sizable decline in the share of Poles who felt 
that the world threatened Poland to some degree.  Thus, the use of the “nationalist” 
moniker to describe extreme-right parties may be less accurate than habitual, and  
 35   
 
Table 3  Trends in Ideology Over Time: Percentage of Respondents by 
Category 
           
  1991 1993 1997 2001 2005 
Nationalism         N/A 
More nationalist 63.3 67.1 54.1 53.6   
Less nationalist 26 24.5 34.9 37.8   
Not sure 10.7 8.4 11 8.6   
Patriarchalism           
More patriarchal 85.5 81.9 77.2 70.7 69 
Less patriarchal 11.7 15.3 19.7 24.8 27.7 
Not sure 2.9 2.8 3.1 4.5 3.3 
Anti-Communism           
More anti-communist 69.3 64.2 60.7 48.9 62.5 
Less anti-communist 15.6 22.1 18.9 24.9 21.2 
Not sure 15.1 13.7 20.4 26.2 16.3 
Social Conservatism           
More socially conservative 70.8 73.9 75.6 73.1 75.6 
Less socially conservative 17.4 16.1 14.1 15.6 15.4 
Not sure 11.8 10 10.3 11.4 9 
Free Market Support           
More free market support 13.5 14.5 14.5 8.8 6.7 
Less free market support 79.9 81.3 81.7 88.2 90.7 
Not sure 6.6 4.2 3.9 3 2.6 
Religious Traditionalism       N/A 
More religious 28.7 33.1 38.9 40   
Less religious 63.8 59.7 51.9 50.5   
Not sure 7.5 7.2 9.2 9.5   
Source: Polish General Social Survey. 
 
should probably be reconsidered.  Patriarchal sentiment has remained quite strong 
over time, although it has also declined from a 1991 high of 85% agreeing or strongly 
agreeing that it’s better for a man to work and a woman to tend the home, to a level of 
about 70% in 2005.  Social conservatism remains high, with very little change over 
time in feelings about homosexuality.  About 75% continue to consider homosexuality 
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always or almost always wrong.  Free market values, never high in Poland, continue to 
decline, especially since 1997; by 2005, 90% of Poles preferred that the government 
undertake income redistribution.  Anti-Communism has remained high—around 70%-
-over time, reaching its nadir in 2001 and then sharply increasing in 2005.  This 
fluctuation is probably due to a post-2001 corruption scandal involving then-ruling 
Social Democrats; the Right has been particularly effective at portraying the Left as 
fraudulent former Communist nomenklatura.  Finally, religious traditionalism has 
been on the rise, as more and more people feel that churches need more authority in 
society.  This has accompanied an actual rise in the power of the Church (as explained 
above), which emphasizes the growing strength of this ideology. 
Yet these findings would also support my hypothesis of “ideological 
discontinuity,” which acknowledges that some conservative, exclusionary, or 
authoritarian tendencies may historically form part of the Polish social identity, but 
makes a distinction in the newness of their symbolic deployment by politicians and 
religious authorities to create a discourse of exclusion and blaming that directly 
motivates political behavior.  The sharp rise in anti-Communist sentiment in 2005 is 
one indication of support for this hypothesis.  The way to determine whether these 
ideological themes are a continuous or discontinuous basis for political behavior is to 
analyze their correlation over time with votes for the Right.  Since 2005 voting 
information is unavailable in the PGSS, I must make predictions on the basis of trends.    
Table 5 presents bivariate correlations between ideological preference and the odds of 
voting for the Right.  We find that, in the early reform period (characterized by the 
1991 and 1993 elections), the Right does not attract significantly greater numbers of 
those who express more conservative/nationalist viewpoints.  In fact, in 1991 the 
Right receives about an equal proportion of votes from respondents expressing 
opposite perspectives on free market support, social conservatism, patriarchalism, 
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anti-Communism, and nationalism!  In this election, many voters were still unsure as 
to what their beliefs were, yet they also choose Right and Left in proportions similar to 
the more opinionated respondents.  This indicates that ideological constructions of the 
Polish identity had not yet begun to motivate political behavior, despite the strong 
presence of conservative values.  In 1993, we know that the Right begins to claim a 
greater percentage of the overall vote: about 40% versus the previous election’s low 
13%.  Polish voters are still more likely to support the Left in every ideological 
category, but those likelihoods go down markedly for those expressing more religious 
and patriarchal views, as indicated by chi-tests for significance.  However, those who 
were more supportive of the free market actually appear to have grown more likely to 
vote for the Left in that year, although this finding is not significant in bivariate 
analysis.  At this point, Poles’ views have begun to diverge, as very few respondents 
fall into the “not sure” categories.   
By 1997, what I will characterize as the first election of the late reform period, 
things seem have shifted quite a bit, which may indicate that the Right has begun to 
appeal to its predicted ideological constituency.  Religious traditionalists, free markets 
supporters, and anti-Communists are all more likely to vote for the Right than for the 
Left, for the first time in Polish election history.  Most respondents are still polarized; 
only anti-Communism seems to draw any significant number of “not sure” responses; 
these fall between the more and less anti-Communist in terms of Right-voting 
likelihood.  In 2001, the Left claims a strong victory, garnering more of the votes in 
every ideological category.  Yet, interestingly, the trends that we have begun to see in 
1997 seem to hold up.  Those who express more religious, socially conservative, 
nationalist, and anti-Communist views, as well as those who are more supportive of 
free market ideology, are much more likely to vote for the Right than those holding 
opposite perspectives.  Again, very few are “not sure” except as regards anti- 
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Table 4 Ideological Preference and Voting Over Time: Cell Counts and Base 2 Log Odds 
of Voting for the Right 
  1991 1993 1997 2001 
  N Odds N Odds N Odds N Odds 
Relig. Traditional.  ** ** *** *** 
More religious Right 337 -1.05 144 -0.14 308 0.64 245 -0.35 
  Left 697   159   197   312   
Less religious Right 333 -1.63 144 -0.89 225 -0.99 115 -2.23 
  Left 1,031   267   447   541   
Not sure Right 19 -1.58 9 -0.53 57 0.44 27 -1.03 
  Left 57   13   42   55   
Free Market Supp.    *** *** 
Right 21 -3.10 38 -1.06 98 0.68 86 -0.22 More free market  
support Left 180   79   61   100   
Right 164 -2.64 231 -0.37 427 -0.42 518 -1.10 Less free market  
support Left 1021   298   571   1108   
Not sure Right 12 -2.84 6 -0.58 6 -0.74 9 -1.00 
  Left 86   9   10   18   
Social Conservatism     * 
Right 154 -2.92 238 -0.46 227 -0.15 339 -0.78 More socially 
conservative Left 1165   327   252   583   
Right 34 -2.89 37 -1.11 44 -0.56 63 -1.30 Less socially 
conservative Left 252   80   65   155   
Not sure Right 26 -2.69 25 -0.36 20 -0.54 30 -1.42 
  Left 168   32   29   80   
Patriarchalism     *   
More patriarchal Right 186 -2.71 250 -0.43 224 -0.24 292 -0.94 
  Left 1219   337   265   560   
Less patriarchal Right 24 -2.81 44 -1.14 65 -0.15 126 -0.81 
  Left 168   97   72   221   
Not sure Right 4 -3.43 6 0.26 5 -1.26 12 -1.54 
  Left 43   5   12   35   
Anti-Communism    *** *** 
More anti-communist Right 141 -2.82 217 -0.58 436 0.26 482 -0.48 
  Left 999   324   363   672   
Less anti-communist Right 36 -2.62 60 -0.66 64 -1.51 69 -2.38 
  Left 221   95   182   358   
Not sure Right 37 -2.52 22 0.14 92 -0.66 72 -1.62 
  Left 212   20   145   221   
Nationalism     * 
More nationalist Right 133 -2.77 220 -0.51 132 -0.36 114 -1.16 
  Left 906   314   170   255   
Less nationalist Right 50 -2.91 72 -0.66 148 -0.09 78 -1.27 
  Left 377   114   157   188   
Not sure Right 31 -2.23 8 -0.46 14 -0.58 4 -3.00 
  Left 145   11   21   32   
* Relationship between ideology and voting is statistically significant at the .05 level for Pearson’s chi-
square test. 
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** Relationship between ideology and voting is statistically significant at the .01 level. 
*** Relationship between ideology and voting is statistically significant at the .001 level. 
 
anti-Communism, where the same pattern holds as in 1997.  The only insignificant 
ideological predictor of right-wing voting is patriarchalism. 
       PGSS voting data for the most recent election in 2005, when the Right claimed 
a landslide victory, are unavailable.  But in the previous 2 elections, ideological trends 
appeared and held up despite changes in overall parliamentary outcome.  This suggests 
that the Right has begun to appeal reliably to certain ideological perspectives within 
the population.  These trends seem to support the hypothesis of “ideological 
discontinuity” put forth by this study.  Strong feelings of support for religious 
traditionalism, social conservatism, and other viewpoints understood by scholars of 
the Right to be constitutive of this identity (i.e., Kitschelt, Verdery, Ost, Swank and 
Betz, etc.) hold important and stable places in the Polish value spectrum, but they do 
not become correlated with right-wing voting until the late reform period.  This 
suggests that political leaders and other opinion-makers began, in the middle to late 
90s, to deploy culturally resonant themes for political purposes.  They drew upon 
known, long-standing Polish values to create an ideology intimately connected with 
parties of the Right.  For the first time, they connected these ideologies to political 
action, making them a motivator for political choices.      
As noted above, bivariate tests suggest an association which may or may not 
persist in the more complete test for multivariate correlation.  Not all of the ideological 
factors have proven significant in the latter test; some factors that were not associated 
in a bivariate context are significant in the final multivariate analysis.  In addition, 
certain control factors have been added into the regressions, allowing me to create a 
model for each election year of independent variables that predict right-wing voting.  
Table 5 displays these four models.   
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Table 5 Fitted Regression Models for Each Election Year: Factors Affecting 
Right-Wing Voting 
 
Year Variables in Model Parameters N -2LL Pseudo R2 
1991 
Religious Traditionalism, Nationalism, 
Social Conservatism, Anti-
Communism, Education and Age 
32 1467 374.02 0.412 
1993 Religious Traditionalism, Education, Income, and Region 
32 657 840.21 0.074 
1997 
Religious Traditionalism, 
Unemployment, Anti-Communism, 
Free Market Values, Region, and Age 
32 570 686.74 0.157 
2001 
Religious Traditionalism, Anti-
Communism, Social Conservatism, and 
Education 
32 616 627.62 0.160 
 
 
In 1991, religious traditionalism, nationalism, social conservatism, anti-
Communism, education, and age are significant predictors of right-wing voting.  In 
1993, religious traditionalism, education, income, and region are the significant 
predictors.  In 1997, the start of what I consider the late reform period, religious 
traditionalism, unemployment, anti-Communism, free market values, region, and age 
are the associated variables; and in 2001, the model includes religious traditionalism, 
anti-Communism, social conservatism, and education.3  Table 6 elaborates on these 
models with odds ratios for voting (the dependent variable) based on ideological 
preference and control factors (the predictor variables).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Pseudo R2 values are reported, although it should be noted that in logistic regression, these do not 
indicate actual percent of variance explained by the model as do R2 values in OLS regression (where 0 
indicates that the model explains none of the variance and 1 indicates that the model explains all 
variance).  Pseudo R2 values are not goodness-of-fit tests, but measure strength of association (Garson 
2007). 
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Table 6  Ideological, Socioeconomic, and Demographic Effects on the Odds of 
Voting for the Right     
  1991 1993 1997 2001 
  
Exp.   
(B) 
95% 
C.I. 
Exp. 
(B) 
95% 
C.I. 
Exp. 
(B) 
95% 
C.I. 
Exp. 
(B) 
95% 
C.I. 
Religious  
Traditionalism    
Less religious  2.57 
1.44   -  
4.59 0.65 
0.47  -   
0.92 0.40 
0.27  -  
0.58 0.28 
0.19  -   
0.43 
Not sure         
(More religious)         
Nationalism  
Less nationalist         
Not sure 17.33 
3.26  - 
92.13       
(More nationalist)         
Anti-Communism  
Less anti-
Communist 2.40 
1.10  -   
5.26   0.36 
0.22  -   
0.60 0.32 
0.18  -   
0.55 
Not sure 7.11 
2.56  - 
19.71   0.45 
0.23  -   
0.85   
(More anti-
Communist)         
Patriarchalism  
Less patriarchal         
Not sure         
(More patriarchal)         
Free Market 
Support  
Less free market 
support     0.54 
0.31  -   
0.96   
Not sure         
(More free market 
support)         
Social 
Conservatism 
 
 
Less socially 
conservative         
Not sure 0.32 
0.14   -   
0.75     0.43 
0.19  -   
0.98 
(More socially 
conservative)         
Unemployment  
1-12 months         
13-60 months     0.19 
0.04   -
0.92   
(Not unemployed)         
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Table 6  (Continued) 
 
Education   
0-4 years         
(8-10 years)         
12-17 years 0.32 
0.18  -   
0.54 0.62 
0.43   -  
0.89   1.72 
1.09   -  
2.71 
Income Quartile 
 
 
Q1 (poorest)   1.87 
1.07  -  
3.28     
Q2          
Q3         
(Q4 (wealthiest))         
East/Central 
Region   1.70 
1.21   -   
2.37 1.70 
1.17   -  
2.47   
Age   
Aged 18-30 5.11 
2.06  -  
12.67   1.78 
1.02  -  
3.09   
Aged 31-50 1.98 
1.08   -   
3.63   1.75 
1.14   -   
2.70   
(Age 51 +)         
Source: Polish General Social Survey. 
 
These data support my hypothesis that ideological factors did not become 
associated with right-wing voting until the late reform period, although a close look is 
necessary to bear this statement out.  Odds ratios, which are a measure of effect size, 
are reported for each category of ideological preference or structural situation, with a 
base category (in parentheses) given for each, against which the others are compared.  
Unlike the base 2 log odds reported in Table 4, the odds ratios reported in Table 6 are 
based on 1: if the value of the odds ratio [labeled Exp(b)] for a categorical variable is 
significant and greater than 1, this indicates a positive effect on the likelihood of 
voting for the Right compared to the base category.  If the value of the odds ratio is 
significant and less than 1, this indicates a negative effect on the likelihood of voting 
for the Right compared to the base category.  For example, for the variable Religious 
Traditionalism, the base is “more religious,” and it encompasses those survey 
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respondents who expressed comparatively strongest religious values.  Thus, in 1991, 
being less religious than the base group had a positive effect of 2.57 of voting for the 
Right.  By contrast, in 2001, being less religious had a negative effect of 0.28 of 
voting for the Right.  Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are also reported.   
The model for 1991 specifies religious traditionalism, nationalism, anti-
Communism, and social conservatism as ideological predictors—but, paradoxically, 
those who feel less strongly or not sure about these values are more likely to vote for 
the Right.  For example, being less religious or less anti-Communist than fellow 
survey respondents increases the odds of right-wing voting.  In terms of control 
variables, being more educated (12-17 years of education) than the base category of 
voters (8-10 years of education) decreases the odds of voting for the Right in this 
earliest election.  There are age effects as well; younger and middle-aged voters were 
more likely to vote for the Right than those above age 50.  In 1993, an interesting 
ideological turnaround has occurred: it appears that less-religious voters have abruptly 
switched their political affiliations, becoming less likely to vote for the Right than the 
more religious.  Structurally, the more educated are again less likely to vote for the 
Right, while living in the depressed East/Central region or falling into the poorest 
quartile of voters increases the likelihood of right-wing voting.   
I consider 1997 the beginning of the late reform period, when voters should be 
expected to become reasonably aware of the effects of their vote choices.  If we expect 
that voters are “rational actors,” iterative voting theory predicts that material interests 
have begun to be connected to particular political platforms and voters have begun to 
choose based on what parties will meet their material needs.  This study has rejected 
such an explanation as overly simplistic in its failure to account for the power of 
ideological and ideal interests, although I do predict that the ideological bases for 
voting will change over time.  I hypothesized that the economically insecure—
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particularly the unemployed, but also the less educated and those living in 
marginalized regions—would be more likely to vote for the Right in the more recent 
elections, as rightist parties became skillful at deploying ideological appeals that 
would resonate most with those who had lost out in the market transition and were 
receptive to scapegoating.   
What do the data say about the bases for right-wing voting in the late reform 
period?  Referring again to Table 6, in 1997 the trend toward decreased likelihood of 
right-wing voting among the less religious continues.  Those who are less anti-
Communist, or not sure how they feel about Communism, are also less likely to vote 
for the Right than their more anti-Communist counterparts.  Those who are less 
supportive of free market values are less likely to vote for the Right as well.  
Structurally, living in the East/Central region of Poland continues to increase Right-
voting likelihood, and being 50 or younger (which did not affect voting in 1993) again 
exhibits the same effects it did in 1991.  Educational attainment has ceased to 
significantly affect voting odds in 1997, but employment status for the first time 
affects voting odds: those who have been unemployed for 13 to 60 months are less 
likely to vote for the Right.  In 2001, the associations between right-wing voting and 
religion, anti-Communism, and social conservatism hold up, and indeed the odds of 
voting for the Right if a respondent is less religious or less anti-Communist are at their 
lowest ever.  The only structural predictor effect in 2001 is that of education.  In the 
early reform period of the first two elections, the less educated vote for the Right 
significantly more often.  But most interestingly, by 2001 it is the most educated (12 
to 17-plus years) who form the Right’s constituency. 
The ideological and structural bases for right-wing voting have changed 
significantly by the late reform period.  In 1991, the Right was supported by less 
religious, less anti-Communist, less educated Poles who were also younger and less 
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sure in their beliefs about nationalism and social conservatism.  Together, this group 
made up only 13% of voters; we may see them as somewhat marginal—they certainly 
didn’t constitute a movement.  While nationalism, patriarchalism, social conservatism, 
and anti-Communism were extremely influential cultural values in this period, they 
were not associated with the Right for voters.  Most Poles were voting for the 
victorious Solidarity party, which would give them their first president, the workers’ 
rights activist Lech Walensa.  By 2001, the picture is much changed; the Right claims 
less support than it did in 1997 or will in 2005, and its constituency has coalesced into 
a very different group than it was in the first election.  The more religious and more 
anti-Communist voters strongly prefer the Right; social conservatism and free market 
values are also associated with right-wing voting, although these relationships are not 
as strong.  And, the more educated—society’s “winners”—are the Right’s structural 
basis; these are certainly not the marginalized, and may actually be the more powerful 
members of society.  The next section will interpret these results in terms of my 
hypotheses and the relevant literature already presented above.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
Looking backwards in time from the 2005 parliamentary elections in Poland, 
where a coalition of right-wing parties campaigning on platforms of religious and 
social conservatism, nationalist/populist rhetoric, and anti-Communism resoundingly 
defeated the incumbent Social Democrats, this study initially presented three possible 
explanations for the Right’s seemingly sudden rise in popularity.  The first two 
proposed that the ideologies that had recently attracted most voters to the Right were 
deeply rooted in Polish culture; macrostructural change had not fundamentally altered 
people’s ways of understanding the world.  “Scenario A” proposed that the capitalist 
transition had been initially successful because it resonated with these ideologies and 
values, and that today’s Right has been successful because it appeals to both 
conservative values and free market ideologies.  “Scenario B” proposed that the initial 
support for the reforms brought by capitalism ultimately clashed with more 
fundamental cultural values of traditionalism and social homogeneity, and that today’s 
Right has been successful because it does not engage any more meaningfully with 
economic questions than the Left, but it does speak to these cultural values.  “Scenario 
C” is similar to Scenario B, but proposed that structural change has brought social 
realignment, and that the resonance of the ideologies presented by right-wing 
platforms today can only be understood as products of this experience, and of the 
differential social locations people now occupy.  None of the scenarios is fully 
supported or discredited by the data.  Yet exploring the data with these explanations in 
mind may help categorize the effects of structural change from socialism to neoliberal 
capitalism. 
Scenario A proposed that ideologies associated today with the Right are in fact 
deeply rooted in Polish culture and have motivated political behavior since the first 
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free election.   This explanation would be supported by the ongoing strength of 
conservative and free market ideologies, and their direct causal connection to right-
wing voting.  Sociologically, this explanation strongly references culture and ideal 
interests as central motivators for action.  Structural transformation would alter these 
interests, since cultural preferences would actually be reinforced through capitalism’s 
realignment of relationships between social groups, manifested through inequality and 
social exclusion.  Though material circumstances change considerably—from relative 
equality in life chances among most social groups under socialism, to levels of 
unemployment and inequality high even under neoliberal expectations—political 
behavior remains the same because a stable ideological underpinning motivates it. 
Empirically, we have seen little support for this scenario—after the initial 
unsettled period when voting was not strongly patterned, the Left continued to claim 
most votes through 2001 despite high, stable levels of support for Catholic religious 
traditionalism and social conservatism.  Also, other conservative values like 
patriarchalism have declined in Polish culture, and support for the free market was 
never high and has also declined markedly.  Furthermore, although most control-factor 
associations with voting are not consistent enough to indicate trends, the most and 
least educated switch party preference by the late reform period.  These results do not 
provide strong support for the claim that culture motivates people’s action in similar 
ways regardless of structural change.   
Scenario B also proposed that conservative ideologies were deeply rooted in 
Polish culture and motivated voting behavior, but interpreted post-Communist social 
organization as incongruent with these values.  Capitalism and free market values 
were extremely attractive to people who had lived with restriction and shortage for so 
long, but more durable religious, family, and ethnic values became the primary basis 
for right-wing support once voters became aware of the “consequences” of choosing 
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the Left—thus reasserting the tendency toward polarization and suppression of 
differences that was strengthened by communist political culture (Rupnik 2007).  
Empirically, this scenario would be buttressed by consistent, cross-social support for 
conservative values, early support for the free market and high initial rates of left-wing 
voting.  By the late reform period, right-wing voting would increase especially among 
economic losers, and would be motivated by social values but not free market 
ideology.  By this point, economic losers such as the unemployed or less educated 
would not see any greater material benefit from choosing either political platform, but 
would find expression of their ideal interests in the Right’s ideological platform.   
This interpretation finds partial support in the data.  The liberal Left is strongly 
preferred in the early reform period, but the Right’s share of votes grows steadily over 
time through 2005, except for the 2001 election.  As noted, most conservative 
ideologies are strongly preferred by respondents throughout the time span, but a closer 
look has shown that some are on the decline and some have markedly risen.  Feelings 
about a woman’s place in the home, the threats that other countries represent to 
Poland, and the unfettered working of the free market seem to have lessened with time 
and greater Europeanization.  Feelings about the evils of homosexuality and 
Communism, and the proper role of the Catholic Church in society, have increased, 
especially by 2005.4  The fact that right-wing voting has become associated primarily 
with social ideologies that have always been fairly strong, and is less motivated by 
economic ideology, gives some credence to Scenario B’s explanation of the Right’s 
rise in Poland.   
But the changing bases of ideological support from 1991 to 2001 bolster 
Scenario C’s dialectical understanding of the relationship between cultural antecedents 
                                                
4 Poles can be strongly anti-Communist yet resoundingly reject the ideals of the free market because 
Communism today represents something different than an economic system; it represents political 
illegitimacy and corruption.   
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and politically-constructed ideal interests.  Religious traditionalism was actually quite 
low in Poland in 1991 (28.7% expressed “more religious” sentiment), but by 2001, it 
was at 40%, and we might assume that in 2005, with the Right’s huge electoral 
victory, this figure would be even higher.  And as it grew, it became more and more 
closely associated with the right-wing; the same goes for social conservatism.  Anti-
Communism was actually declining through 2001 but in 2005, there is a marked 
increase in this sentiment, and its association with right-wing voting is at an all-time 
high.  It seems the Right has staked out certain cultural values, cultivating and 
fomenting them, despite Western expectations that Europeanization and liberalism 
would slowly dissolve them as it has with nationalism and patriarchalism.  Thus 
cultural preferences and values are not static; they change and motivate different 
behaviors according to historical and structural transformations.   
This may seem an intuitive point, but the scholarly debate over the rise of the 
Right in Central and Eastern Europe has often discounted the idea that these post-
Communist societies could ever experience a “return to democracy” because deep-
rooted religious, authoritarian, and conservative preferences have more or less 
continually motivated political behavior even through the switch to capitalism (i.e., 
Korbonski 1993; Verdery 1996).  Scenario C, based on a theory associated with David 
Ost and others, inverts this causal direction, pointing to politicians’ manipulation of 
certain values into an ideological defense against liberalism and social upheaval.  A 
quote from the Polish minister of education is revealing: “Asked about his intention to 
repudiate Darwinism from school curricula the Polish minister of education answered, 
“We’ve managed without tolerance for long enough. And we shall manage without it 
even now” (Rupnik 2007). This construction of a symbolic “Polishness,” claimed to 
have withstood the test of time and macrosocial change, allows leaders to consolidate 
people’s voting behaviors around their ideal interests rather than their material needs.        
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Scenario C predicts changes in why people vote for the Right; it also predicts 
changes in who votes for the Right, which theories of ideological continuity do not 
adequately address.  The economic inequality accompanying the transition from 
socialism to capitalism is expected to primarily provoke disadvantaged Poles to flock 
to this platform’s organization of economic anger into resonant ideological channels.  
Protest against liberal, permissive, corrupt elites, as well as ethnic and religious 
outsiders is a mainstay of right-wing platforms in Poland and across Europe.  
However, the results of regression on control factors reveal this to be the main 
weakness of Scenario C’s explanation of the Right’s rise: there is no support for the 
contention that economic losers are more attracted to the Right after the effects of 
market reform have played out; in fact a trend in the opposite direction may have 
begun.  
Looking back to Table 6, through the 1997 election, being in the poorest 
income quartile, ceasing education after 4 years, maintaining unemployment for more 
than a year, or living in the depressed East/Central region of the country might 
increase one’s likelihood of right-wing preference.  But in 2001, none of these effects 
is exerted; the only structural determinant of right-wing voting is being the most 
educated.  Why might those who have benefited from neoliberal reform be more likely 
to symbolically protest against it with their votes?  One might speculate that the Right, 
in openly embracing the free market and rejecting wealth redistribution relative to the 
Left’s rhetorical position, may be attracting the more educated because they are better 
equipped to succeed in a market-based economy.  Yet, although supporters of the free 
market become more likely to vote for the Right in the late reform period, this effect is 
not significant in multivariate regression modeling—so voting does seem based on 
ideal rather than material interests even for those whose economic interests do 
coincide with the priorities of the Right.  Indeed, my hypothesis had not predicted the 
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emergence of free market values as an ideological basis for right-wing voting even 
under the assumption that the unemployed or the poor were the groups more attracted 
to the Right.  I had theorized that right-wing voters were unsure as to which party 
supported their economic interests, so they had come to rely on social values, which 
provided “scapegoats” (“deviants” or disrupters of the desired social order) for the 
frustrations of 21st century capitalist life.  This theory retains some support from the 
data, since the Right seems to be more relevant to ideal interests than to material 
interests. 
How do these findings fit into similar studies on the structural bases of the 
Right’s rise?  As noted, neoliberalism and globalization, by increasing volume and 
instability of capital and migration flows, have been thought to trigger defensive 
exclusionary sentiment among those most acutely affected by changing labor markets 
and decreasing wages (see Swank and Betz 2003: p. 220-221).  Yet, some scholars 
have been surprised to find that, contrary to their hypotheses, the disadvantaged may 
not be the source of the Right’s new power.  Knigge (1998), for example, has found 
that her initial expectation of a positive correlation between unemployment and right-
wing voting is unsupported by evidence from six Western European countries.  She 
had hypothesized that “electorates lend their support to extreme right-wing parties as a 
function of crises in the economic, social, and political realms,” but, she found that 
only social and political crises—rising levels of immigration and dissatisfaction with 
incumbent political parties—facilitated right-wing voting (p. 272); unemployment 
exerted no discernible macro-level influence on right-wing extremism.  Although it 
appears initially that her findings are inapplicable to this study because of the absence 
of major structural change in Western Europe, note that the late reform period in 
Poland, when the material effects of structural change and vote choice are presumed to 
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be well understood by voters, also lacks any correlation between unemployment and 
right-wing voting.   
Greskovits (2007) has been prominently opposed to theories connecting the 
disadvantaged to the right-wing.  Not only does he believe that the marginalized are 
more politically apathetic and inactive (pointing, for example, to low overall voter 
turnout in CEE countries such as Poland and Hungary as evidence), to the extent that 
the large number of out-migrant work-seekers may have stopped from participating 
completely, but he goes a step further in suggesting that the middle class and elites are 
the true drivers of the Right’s rise.  Rather than the less skilled and less successful 
using extremist ideologies to scapegoat immigrants who compete for jobs, or corrupt 
former Communist elements who set aside the country’s resources for themselves, 
Greskovits believes that the Right’s support is located among “vocal middle class 
groups—including higher education students and young professionals—[who] tend to 
identify the utmost obstacle to their own upward mobility not at the ‘top’ in rival elite 
groups but at the bottom: in the masses of losers…untaxable pensioners, abusers of 
health care, welfare-parasites, or excess armies of public service providers” (p. 22).  
He is thus not surprised that right-wing parties campaigning on platforms of radical 
neoliberalism (lowered flat taxes, welfare retrenchment, etc.) have done well.   
Yet, as I have noted, I did not find consistent economic bases for rightist 
voting (i.e., free market support), so Greskovits’ explanation can be only partially 
supported by my study.  I believe that the middle class is voting for the Right 
primarily for ideological reasons; material interests may be implicated but are not 
statistically significant.  I acknowledge that my findings do not directly shed light on 
voting patterns in the most recent election of 2005, which was the high-water mark of 
support for the right-wing.  It may be that free market values become decisively 
correlated with right-wing voting at this point (as they are, briefly, in 1997).  But, as 
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Table 4 shows, free market values are at an all-time low among all Polish GSS 
respondents in 2005, so this development seems unlikely.  This does not rule out an 
economic dimension to the rise of the Right among middle-class voters.  Market 
reforms have tended to favor the more educated and skilled; those who have been 
successful under reform may be exhibiting classically liberal views in defense of 
earnings won under conditions of “equal opportunity.”  The threat of Communist 
elements and “outsiders”—those who do not fit into the moral or ethnic ideal of 
Polishness—claiming a piece of economic pie that they do not deserve pushes the 
winners toward a defensive ideological position recently encapsulated by the political 
platform of the Right.   
It is also possible that education is a less significant marker of structural 
position than Greskovits assumes.  Perrucci and Wysong (2007)’s theory of “the new 
class society” proposes that higher education is no longer a “backbone” of 
socioeconomic stratification, dividing the haves from the have-nots.  As education has 
become more generally accessible in advanced industrialized societies, other 
determinants of social location have become more prominent; occupational status 
(achieved through family resources, social ties, education, etc.) is one of these.  
Perhaps attaining more than 12 years of education in Poland has become common 
enough that it exerts a marginal effect on social position and material interests, and the 
association seen between the most educated and right-wing voting is concealing a 
parallel occupation-based structural division.  In order to test this, I regressed all the 
same predictor variables on the voting index but replaced the categorical variables for 
education with categorical variables for occupation.  In keeping with the variable 
structure for education, I created three categories approximating working-class (skilled 
agricultural workers, element occupations, machine operators), middle-class (service, 
crafts and tradespeople, clerks) and upper class (managers, professionals, technicians), 
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with the middle category as the base against which the others would be compared to 
determine differentials in voting odds.   
Tables 5b and 6b (see Appendix) show that occupation is not a significant 
predictor of voting in any year.  Replacing the education variable with occupational 
status does change overall models slightly for each year: patriarchalism becomes 
associated with voting in 1991, and unemployment for 13-60 months ceases to be 
associated with voting in 1997.  Most notably, no structural factors are associated with 
voting in 2001!  Those respondents in elite jobs are no more likely to vote for the 
Right than those in middle class or working class positions.  Occupation (under 
capitalism) is more directly related to income than education is, and thus a stronger 
indicator of one’s status as an economic “winner” or “loser” in post-socialist Poland.  
So, in keeping with Perrucci and Wysong’s theory, I interpret this as evidence that 
educational attainment is not an extremely reliable determinant of structural location 
in this context.  Yet the correlation between right-wing voting and more education 
remains quite noteworthy for this study, because it provides evidence against my 
hypothesis that social disadvantage increases the likelihood of voting for parties that 
speak to ideal interests rather than material interests.   
  I had predicted that those who had benefited least from the structural changes 
accompanying socialism’s revolutionary replacement with capitalism would be most 
likely to shape their political behavior around ideologies that displaced confused 
economic anger onto clear social targets.  To theoretically ground this prediction, I 
used the power/ideology connection put forth by Stuart Hall and others who explored 
hegemony and the political manipulation of interests.   I found that right-wing voting 
is indeed motivated by ideal and not material factors, but I discovered that this process 
seems to occur regardless of social location, and actually seems to be more strongly 
associated with those who might have less cause for economic anger.  I believe that 
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the theory connecting actors’ economic circumstances with their receptivity to 
ideological explanations of those circumstances is still applicable to the rise of the 
Right in Poland; because this line of theory clearly rejects determinism between 
particular ideas and particular social classes/locations, ideological constructions of 
identity can be just as likely to appeal to more advantaged groups as I had predicted 
they would for the less advantaged.  It’s possible that the more educated are more 
defensive of their gains, or more confident of their values’ moral correctness.   
The connection between certain ideologies and support for the Right, and its 
relatively recent construction, is the strongest finding of this study.  Because it has 
been difficult to establish reliable trends based on structural location, I can only 
speculate on the connection between material interests and right-wing voting.  While I 
had suggested that Poland’s disadvantaged were becoming fatalistic in their 
abandonment of the voter’s right and responsibility to push for policy solutions to 
socio-economic problems, my findings offer a more encouraging understanding of 
these citizens’ political choices.  Neoliberalism’s losers may not be turning to 
ideological politics, as Ost suggests, nor are they simply apathetic, as Greskovits 
claims.  As globalization and neoliberalism have become more entrenched and less 
reversible in Poland, those who stand to benefit least have turned relatively more to 
the Left, increasingly rejecting free market values and anti-Communism.  They seem 
quite able to connect their declining economic and social fortunes to an increasing 
distance from socialism’s relative equality, even though they may continue to reject 
socialism as a coherent system.  They, more than the most educated Poles, are trying 
to hold their government accountable for their economic welfare.   
Looking back on the debate over revolutionary ideology, it seems that neither 
specific political programs (i.e., neoliberal market reform) nor cultural heritage (i.e., 
conservative nationalism) are the fundamental determinants of which direction a post-
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transformation society will ultimately go in.  No society is a closed system, and 
changing global conditions, resulting in new structural locations for groups and 
nations, will continually modify or alter actors’ prioritizing of values.  Sociologists 
expect that “after the fall of [an] old regime struggles emerge over what the revolution 
was really about, and over how to interpret the society’s cultural heritage” (Burns 
1996: p. 374).  While Poles were united in prioritizing anti-Communism and 
democracy during their “unsettled” revolutionary period, the long-term outcome has 
revealed a decidedly polarized set of values that may be differently resonant across 
social locations.  The Right in Poland has been successful at reinterpreting that long-
ago revolution as part of an ongoing dismantling of corruption, theft, and moral crime 
against the “true” Polish people.  The Left has no powerful counter-interpretation, 
because it presents the new globalized organization of society as-is, offering nothing 
symbolic to fight against and “channel anger productively.”       
These findings may contribute to the ongoing debate over conservatism’s 
relationship to the macro-social changes that people in every country are today 
experiencing; only a few shape these changes while most must merely react.  I remain 
interested in the implications this study may provide vis-à-vis the Right’s place in US 
politics.  Will the growing income gap create more right-wing adherents among those 
towards the bottom, as I would have expected before undertaking this study, or among 
those towards the top, as I have come to anticipate now?  Prolonged analysis is 
certainly justified, as findings continue to topple expectations and received wisdom. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 5b Fitted Regression Models for Each Election Year (Occupation 
Replacing Education) 
 
Year Variables in Model Parameters N -2LL Pseudo R2 
1991 
Religious Traditionalism, Nationalism, 
Social Conservatism, Patriarchalism, 
Anti-Communism, Occupation, Age 
32 1372 355.38 0.411 
1993 Religious Traditionalism, Occupation, Income, and Region 
32 616 783.11 0.077 
1997 
Religious Traditionalism, Anti-
Communism, Free Market Values, 
Region, Age 
32 527 624.23 0.174 
2001 Religious Traditionalism, Anti-Communism, Social Conservatism 
32 616 629.62 0.158 
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Table 6b  Ideological, Socioeconomic, and Demographic Effects on the Odds of 
Voting for the Right (Occupation Replacing Education)    
 
  1991 1993 1997 2001 
  
Exp. 
(B) 
95% 
C.I. 
Exp. 
(B) 
95% 
C.I. 
Exp. 
(B) 
95% 
C.I. 
Exp. 
(B) 
95% 
C.I. 
Religious  
Traditionalism    
Less religious  2.88 
1.57   -  
5.28 0.65 
0.46  -   
0.92 0.40 
0.27  -  
0.60 0.28 
0.18  -   
0.53 
Not sure         
(More religious)         
Nationalism  
Less nationalist         
Not sure 17.91 
3.30  - 
97.22       
(More nationalist)         
Anti-Communism  
Less anti-
Communist 2.38 
1.07  -   
5.27   0.33 
0.20  -   
0.56 0.31 
0.18  -   
0.53 
Not sure 5.65 
2.02  - 
15.84   0.42 
0.22  -   
0.81   
(More anti-
Communist)         
Patriarchalism  
Less patriarchal 2.50 
1.01  -  
6.20       
Not sure         
(More patriarchal)         
Free Market 
Support  
Less free market 
support     0.45 
0.24  -   
0.83   
Not sure         
(More free market 
support)         
Social 
Conservatism 
 
 
Less socially 
conservative         
Not sure 0.36 
0.15   -   
0.87     0.44 
0.19  -   
0.99 
(More socially 
conservative)         
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Table 6b  (Continued) 
 
Unemployment  
1-12 months         
13-60 months     
Not 
sig.    
(Not unemployed)         
Occupation  
Working class 3.49 
1.97  -  
6.17 2.02 
1.37  -  
2.98     
(Middle class)         
Upper class         
Income Quartile  
Q1 (poorest)   1.96 
1.10  -  
3.48     
Q2          
Q3         
(Q4 (wealthiest))         
East/Central 
Region   1.62 
1.15   -   
2.30 1.74 
1.18   -  
2.45   
Age   
Aged 18-30 4.47 
1.75  -  
11.39   2.02 
1.08  -  
3.78   
Aged 31-50 1.85 
1.02   -   
3.36   1.58 
1.02   -   
2.45   
(Age 51 +)         
Source: Polish General Social Survey. 
Bold lettering indicates where directionality or presence of association is different from Table 6.       
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